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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
FRANK P. O'DONNELL, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
vs. ) 
) Trial Court No. 884902181DA 
MARY A. O'DONNELL, ) Appeal Court No. 930300-CA 
) Priority No. 16 
Defendant/Appellee. ) 
000O000 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the District Court's Order denying 
Plaintiff Frank P. O'Donnell's petition to modify a Divorce Decree 
to reduce child support and eliminate both alimony and his 
obligation to pay his child's tuition for private school - as well 
as pay $4,000.00 in attorney fees and costs to Defendant Mary A. 
O'Donnell as partial payment of costs incurred in defending against 
the Defendant's Petition. 
The Decree of Divorce was entered on August 9, 1990, in 
a bifurcated proceeding with the financial issues reserved until 
February, 1991. On February 28, 1991, the financial issues were 
resolved based on the parties' proffers, court rulings and 
stipulations. At that time, based upon representations made by the 
Plaintiff of his income and ability to pay, the parties stipulated 
to an award of $500.00 per month alimony and $500.00 per month 
child support, with Plaintiff agreeing to pay the parties' minor 
child's health insurance, private school tuition and registration 
fees. Defendant was to pay remaining private school expenses. On 
October 10, 1991, the court entered an Amended Supplemental Decree 
of Divorce reflecting this agreement. 
On October 3, 1991, Mr. O'Donnell filed a Petition to 
Modify the Decree of Divorce seeking to terminate his alimony 
obligation, reduce the child support payments and eliminate his 
obligation to pay private school tuition and registration expenses. 
After a trial of the issues on November 30, 1992, the 
court in a December 4, 1992 Minute Entry ruling denied the Petition 
to Modify the Divorce Decree, finding that there had been no 
substantial change in Mr. O'Donnell's circumstances. On April 1, 
1993, the court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. On May 11, 1993, the court made a further Minute Entry 
awarding Defendant $4,000.00 in attorney fees and costs and on June 
11, 1993 entered its implementing Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant accepts the Statement of Facts as set out in 
the Plaintiff's brief, with the following additions: 
Plaintiff has failed to pay the support he agreed to pay 
and the court ordered him to pay from shortly after the entry of 
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the Decree of Divorce. This resulted in judgements for unpaid 
support being entered against him as follows: 
Entry Date of Judgement AMOUNT 
September 18, 1991 (R. 317) $2,003.78 
(Medical Expenses) $ 1,003.78 
(Alimony - July & Aug.) $ 1,000.00 
October 10, 1991 (R. 360, 
and R. 354) 
Unpaid alimony $14,136.00 $6,000.00 
for period of 
Sept. 1990 to Oct., 1991 
February 2, 1992 (R. 433) $3,000.00 
Alimony (9 - 12/1992) $ 2,000.00 
Child Support 11 -12/92) $ 1,000.00 
May 3, 1993 (R. 667) $9,740.00 
Alimony $ 6,000.00 
Child Support $ 3,390.00 
Attorney's Fees $ 350.00 
June 11, 1993 (R.697) $4,000.00 
Attorney's Fees for 
defense of Petition 
to Modify Divorce Decree 
TOTAL AMOUNT OF JUDGMENTS OUTSTANDING: $24,743.78 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court did not err in considering the 
Plaintiff's present wife's income when appraising Plaintiff's 
current financial situation. Courts may consider a new spouse's 
income when determining the supporting spouse's ability to pay. 
Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986), Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 
P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980) and Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (.Utah 
App. 1992). 
II. The trial court did not err in citing Rasband v. 
Rasband, 752 P. 2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988) , to conclude that the value 
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of company-paid travel, vehicle and entertainment expenses may be 
weighed when calculating Plaintiff's overall income. The court 
rightfully included the personal benefit received by Plaintiff and 
his wife, as well as the measure of control Plaintiff and his wife 
exerted over the company's policies, procedures and records. Muir 
v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1992) 
III. The trial court's findings that Plaintiff's income 
was difficult to establish and that Plaintiff failed to establish 
his income were not in error, particularly in view of his status as 
director, vice-president and stockholder of the company and his 
current wife's status as bookkeeper for the company. Neither 
Plaintiff nor his current wife were able to remember the amount of 
additional benefits that had been paid. Furthermore, after being 
asked in discovery to produce the document that detailed some of 
these expenses, neither Plaintiff nor his wife were able to explain 
in court why it had not been produced. The court rightfully found 
that the income was difficult to determine under these 
circumstances. Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1992). 
IV. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
awarding $4,000.00 in attorney fees to Defendant, given the 
significantly higher income level of Plaintiff, the difference in 
standards of living enjoyed by Plaintiff and his current wife as 
compared with Defendant's and the fact that Plaintiff had 
continually failed to pay to Defendant the alimony and child 
support he had agreed to and had been ordered to pay in the Decree 
of Divorce. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONSIDERING 
PLAINTIFF'S WIFE'S INCOME WHEN DETERMINING 
PLAINTIFF'S FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The Plaintiff's present wife's income may be considered 
in determining that no substantial change of circumstances had 
occurred. This rule was specifically articulated in Paffel v. 
Paf fel, 732 P. 2d 96 (Utah 1986) and was properly applied by the 
trial court in the instant matter. Plaintiff seeks to overturn 
the trial court's holding that the new spouse's income may be 
considered. In order to accomplish this, Plaintiff must either 
have this court reverse the Utah Supreme Court ruling in Paffel, 
supra, or demonstrate that the trial court's finding was clearly 
erroneous. Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 1991) . 
To establish that a finding is clearly erroneous, appellant must 
first marshall all the evidence that supports the finding and then 
demonstrate that, despite this evidence, the finding is so lacking 
in support as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence." Id. 
Plaintiff has not provided a basis for this court to disregard the 
Supreme Court or demonstrated that the finding is clearly 
erroneous. He has instead referred only to the evidence that 
supports the outcome he desires. In fact, the evidence weighs 
heavily against his position. 
In Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P. 2d 1374 (Utah 1980) , the Utah 
Supreme Court acknowledged that the trial court was not precluded 
from evaluating the new spouse's income as part of "determining the 
ability of one who does have the legal obligation [to pay child] 
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support." 619 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Utah 1980) . Then in Paffel, supra, 
the court ruled specifically that the trial court should consider 
the income of the new spouse in its determination of the financial 
resources and condition of the payor spouse. 732 P.2d at 101-102. 
This was declared to be a required consequence of the Kiesel, 
supra, ruling. 732 P.2d at 102. 
After Kiesel, the Utah legislature limited the ruling by 
prohibiting the courts from considering a new spouse's income in 
setting child support obligations. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 
818, 822 (Utah App. 1992) . Thus, while the income of a new spouse 
may not be considered in determining the adjusted gross income for 
child support purposes under U.C.A. § 78-45-7.4 of the Utah Code, 
the Kiesel and Paffel rules remained in effect for alimony, 
attorney's fees and costs. As this Court stated in Crockett: 
Inasmuch as the legislature has not placed a similar 
prohibition on considering a new spouse's income when 
determining whether to award attorney fees and costs, the 
discretionary arena within which the trial court must 
make its decision is similar to that in place when the 
supreme court made its ruling in Kiesel. We therefore 
similarly hold that a trial court is not precluded as a 
matter of law from considering the income of a receiving 
parent's new spouse when determining the receiving 
parent's "need" for costs and attorney fees. 
836 P. 2d at 822. The Court of Appeals clearly ruled that trial 
courts continue -- post-legislative enactment --to have discretion 
in considering the factors that constitute each party's financial 
situation when considering the issues of alimony, attorney's fees 
and costs. 
The legislative intent of U.C.A. § 78-45-7.4 of the Utah 
Code is not, by ignoring a stepparent's income, to disregard the 
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fact that one party is in a substantially better position 
financially through employment, inheritance or remarriage. 
According to the code, a trial court may consider the standard of 
living and relative wealth of each party if the child support 
guidelines are rebutted. U.C.A. § 78-45-7(3) (a) , (b) of the Utah 
Code. Such a measurement of the parties' respective standards of 
living necessitates a contemplation of the new spouse's 
contributions to the living standard. U.C.A. § 78-45-7.4 of the 
Utah Code merely prevents stepparents' income from being factored 
into adjusted gross income for child support awards. 
It is interesting to note that the legislature's intent 
was not to prevent the stepparent from having any obligation to 
support the stepchild. U.C.A. § 78-45-4.1 of the Utah Code states 
that "[a] stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same extent 
that a natural or adoptive parent is required to support a child. 
It was limited to delineating the resources applied in payment of 
child support. It would appear that the legislature's goal in 
passing § 78-45-7.4 of the Utah Code was very narrow: to use only 
the income of the child's two parents -- whether natural or 
adoptive -- in the equation setting the child support award. The 
goal was not to prevent any consideration of the new spouse's 
income in every matter having to do with the party's first family. 
Plaintiff next argues that the facts of Paffel v. Paffel, 
supra, are inapposite to those in the case at bar. The thrust of 
Paffel, upon which the Utah Supreme Court based its decision, was 
that the supporting spouse's ability to pay is affected by the new 
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spouse's income. The fact that the appellant in Paf fel did not 
include his new wife's income while offsetting his income with her 
expenses is not determinative to the trial court's use of Paf fel in 
the instant case. The substance of both cases is the same. Both 
courts were looking at the supporting spouse's financial situation, 
a factor of which is the new spouse's income and support 
obligation. Whether the new spouse's expenses were included in the 
calculations would merely mean a difference in numbers, not in 
process. 
In Paffel, part of the court's discussion included 
statements regarding the inclusion of expenses without the 
concurrent inclusion of income inferred that the results presented 
a skewed version of the husband's financial status. 732 P.2d at 
101-102. However, that was only a part of the discussion. The 
court clearly ruled it is appropriate to consider a present 
spouse's income in determining the economic status of and the 
ability to pay by an obligor. 732 P. 2d at 102. In the instant 
case, where the true incomes of both husband and new wife are 
difficult to discern, the exact sum is not as significant as the 
fact that it is - even at the minimum cimount claimed 
significantly higher than Defendant's income and still well within 
the range of Plaintiff's ability to pay the support ordered. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN VALUING THE 
TRAVEL AND ENTERTAINMENT BENEFITS AVAILABLE TO 
PLAINTIFF WHEN CONSIDERING HIS INCOME TO 
DETERMINE IF A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES HAD OCCURRED. 
The trial court correctly considered the value of Plaintiff's 
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employer provided perquisite benefits to determine that no 
substantial change in circumstances had occurred. Muir v. Muir, 
841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah App. 1992); Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 
1251 (Utah App. 1989), cert, dismissed, 795 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1990). 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988) . In Muir, 
supra, this court discussed this issue at great length, 841 P. 2d at 
739 - 741 and the trial court's ruling effects those directions. 
A trial court's decision concerning modification of a 
divorce decree will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. 
Crouse, 817 P.2d at 838; Hacren v. Hagen, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah 
App. 1991) (citing Myers v. Myers, 768 P.2d 979, 984 (Utah App. 
1989)). It is the burden of the party seeking modification to 
demonstrate that there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances that justifies modification. Walton v. Walton, 814 
P. 2d 619, 621 (Utah App. 1991) . Plaintiff was unable to demonstrate 
such a change. The trial court, relying in part on Rasband v. 
Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988), concluded that travel and 
entertainment expenses should be considered in determining 
Plaintiff's income. The trial court found that the Plaintiff's 
business perquisites constituted a substantial benefit, requiring 
an upward adjustment of his stated income. After adjusting the 
stated income to include the employment benefits, the trial court 
found that there was no substantial change in the Plaintiff's 
circumstances. These determinations are all correct in fact and 
law. Muir v. Muir, supra. 
The trial court did not err in citing Rasband to stand 
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for the concept that the value of perks and expense accounts should 
be considered when determining Plaintiff's income. The court in 
Rasband rightfully gave value to these additional sources of 
revenue when considering the husband's ability to pay alimony. The 
valuation of perks is a well-established convention that occurs in 
many areas of the law. This was articulated in detail in the 
recent decision of this court in Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 739-741. 
It is common practice for corporations and businesses to use 
expense accounts and perks as a form of compensation, allowing tax 
benefits to both employee and employer. To say that such benefits 
have no impact on the overall financial standing of an employee is 
simply wrong, especially when the employee derives personal benefit 
as Plaintiff did from the company car and the entertainment expense 
account. Thus, consideration of these corporation-paid expenses 
was not error, particularly in view of Plaintiff's control over the 
direction of the business as director, Vice-President, stockholder, 
and major employee. 
When an employee derives his income from a closely-held 
corporation, benefits and expense accounts paid by the corporation 
are commonly factored into the employee's total income in cases 
like the case at bar. Muir v. Muir, supra. The corporate 
compensation paid to an employee such as Plaintiff may be 
manipulated by him. Thus both individual income and corporate 
income should be considered in determining the employee's financial 
status, on an assumption that the employee benefitted personally 
from expenditures of the business. Trial courts have the 
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discretion to consider several factors when evaluating a business 
owner's income, see e.g., Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774, 777 
(Utah 1992) (accounts receivables may be used to pay alimony) ; 
Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985) (may consider 
corporate benefits such as bonuses, pension contributions, and 
profit-sharing accounts); Christiansen v. Christiansen, 667 P.2d 
592, 594 (Utah 1983) (may consider both business owner's individual 
income and the corporation's income in considering a petition by 
the divorced wife for modification of alimony and child support); 
English v. English, 565 P. 2d 409, 412 (Utah 1977) (may consider 
business owner's historical earning ability to determine income). 
The court in Christiansen found, and the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed, that the husband had benefitted more than his stated 
corporate salary indicated, including personal benefit from 
expenditures of the business for an employee benefit program and an 
auto allowance. 
Thus, recognition of the tangible economic benefit 
provided by expense accounts and perks is well-established in Utah 
law. The trial court acted appropriately in application of this 
law to this case. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
Plaintiffs INCOME DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH IN 
VIEW OF PLAINTIFF'S AND PLAINTIFF'S WIFE'S 
CONTROL OVER THE COMPANY AND THE COMPANY'S 
RECORDS. 
The trial court found that "[i]t is very difficult from 
the records brought into court and the testimony of Plaintiff and 
his wife, to determine precisely what is the Plaintiff's income." 
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(R. 638). A trial court's findings will not be disturbed unless 
they are clearly erroneous, that is, against the clear weight of 
the evidence, or unless the appellate court reaches a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Dunn v. Dunn, 802 
P.2d 1314, 1317 (UtahApp. 1990).; Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings 
of fact . . . shall not be set aside unless cleairly erroneous . . 
. " ) . To demonstrate that a finding of fact is clearly 
erroneous, Plaintiff must first marshall all the evidence that 
supports the finding and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence the finding is so lacking in support as to be against the 
clear weight of the evidence. Crockett, 836 P.2d at 820/ Crouse, 
817 P. 2d at 838. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the 
evidence is so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight 
of the evidence. In fact, after extensive testimony as to expenses 
paid by the Plaintiff's company, the evidence clearly showed that 
arriving at a fixed amount of income for Plaintiff would be 
extremely difficult, as neither Plaintiff (T. 70-86) nor 
Plaintiff's wife (T. 110)-- the company's bookkeeper -- was able to 
remember the amounts in question. Moreover, even after discovery 
requests by Defendant, the detailed expense records that might have 
provided the information were not produced by the Plaintiff (T. 85-
88) . Thus, while if Plaintiff had been more able to furnish exact 
numbers, the trial court might have found Plaintiff's income 
determinable, but he failed to do so and the court properly 
exercised its discretion in analyzing and applying that failure. 
Second, Plaintiff's position as director and vice-
12 
president of the company and his wife's position as bookkeeper led 
the court to hold that establishing precisely what each receives 
from the company is very difficult. Several recent decisions have 
explored this problem based upon analogous fact situations. In 
Muir v. Muir, the Utah Court of Appeals held that " [d]etermining 
[the] Husband's income is complex because he derives his income 
from a closely-held corporation." 841 P. 2d 736, 739 (Utah App. 
1992). In Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the trial court had erred in considering 
only the husband's stated income, 700 P. 2d at 1076 (Utah 1985) and 
ruled that the trial court should have considered that the husband 
"had control over the entire profit, but chose to take only half of 
it for personal income and to set the rest aside for reinvestment 
in the business." .Id. As cataloged in Muir v. Muir, supra, this 
court found that the extra benefits that certain companies provide 
for their employees, including a company car or expense accounts, 
tend to obscure the actual value of the benefits or compensation 
received. 841 P.2d at 739 - 741. 
The ability of the Plaintiff to determine how 
compensatory arrangements are set up was clear to the trial court; 
particularly where he founded the company and his present spouse is 
its bookkeeper. Thus, the trial court's unwillingness to accept 
Plaintiff's estimations of his income as fact is not clearly 
erroneous. If Plaintiff wished to convince the trial court of a 
substantial change in circumstances, he was obligated to meet the 
burden of proof. He failed to do so just as he has failed to 
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marshall the evidence in support of the judgment before this court. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 
DEFENDANT. 
A trial court has broad discretion in awarding costs and 
attorney fees in divorce and modification proceedings pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989). Crockett, 836 P.2d at 819, 821; 
Crouse, 817 P. 2d at 840. The trial court must base its decision to 
award attorney fees upon evidence of the financial need of the 
receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the 
reasonableness of the fees. Crockett, 836 P. 2d at 821; Bell v. 
Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1991). Both the decision to 
award attorney fees and the amount of such fees are within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. Crouse, 817 P. 2d at 840; Kerr 
v. Kerr, 610 P. 2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980) . Where a trial court may 
exercise broad discretion, the correctness of the court's decision 
is presumed absent "manifest injustice or inequity that indicates 
a clear abuse of . . . discretion. Crockett, 836 P. 2d at 819-20 
(quoting Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App. 1987)). 
There is no evidence that the trial court abused its 
discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the Defendant. The 
trial court found that Defendant made substantially less monthly 
income than Plaintiff, demonstrating a need to have some of her 
attorney's fees paid by Plaintiff. Moreover, the trial court found 
that Defendant had not been paid amounts owed to her by Plaintiff 
from earlier judgments against him for failure to pay the alimony 
and child support ordered in the divorce decree. (R. 674) . The 
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Plaintiff's failure to pay the support he agreed to pay and was 
ordered to pay is clearly an exacerbating factor in Defendant's 
inability to pay her own fees to defend the earlier divorce decree. 
Even though the trial court found the Defendant in need 
of assistance in paying her fees and costs and the fees she had 
been charged to be reasonable, the Plaintiff was not ordered to pay 
them in full. The court thus properly applied the governing 
standards. 
There is a second basis upon which the trial court should 
be affirmed. In situations such as this, where the Defendant is 
forced into court to defend against attacks on orders in her favor, 
the courts have found it entirely just to award attorney's fees 
simply because they have been required to defend the action. In 
Lynale v. Lvncrle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah App. 1992), the court 
held that where the wife was not seeking to obtain or modify a 
divorce decree but to enforce the provisions of a decree she 
obtained in 1986, the trial court could award attorney's fees based 
solely upon its discretion, regardless of financial need. Id. The 
obvious principle at work is that the Defendant should not be 
forced to finance Plaintiff's attempt to avoid paying the ordered 
support. 
Neither should Defendant's attorney or firm be forced to 
absorb the loss. The court found Plaintiff's argument that 
Defendant had not yet been charged for her attorney's fees by her 
attorney to be unpersuasive and beside the point, holding that she 
did in fact owe them. (R. 674, 698). Plaintiff not only fails to 
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marshall the evidence in support of this, he fails to show any 
error in that determination. Thus, Defendant is due her attorney's 
fees and the trial court did not err in awarding them. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES 
Defendant has been required to incur additional 
attorney's fees and costs in defending this appeal. She was 
awarded fees by the trial court. This court should award Defendant 
the costs and attorney's fees she incurred in defending this 
appeal. Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 4 (Utah App. 1992). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly determined to deny Plaintiff's 
Petition to modify the Decree of Divorce. He has failed to meet 
the burden of proof required to overturn the trial court's rulings 
before this court. The trial court did not err in considering the 
Plaintiff's new wife's income as part of the determination of 
Plaintiff's financial circumstances. This court and the Utah 
Supreme Court have found that a new spouse's income may be 
considered in determining the supporting spouse's ability to pay. 
Nor did the trial court err in finding that the additional benefits 
provided by Plaintiff's company should be considered when 
determining Plaintiff's income and that the income of both 
Plaintiff and Plaintiff's wife was difficult to ascertain. In 
situations like this one, in which Plaintiff has substantial 
control over the financial management of the company, all potential 
sources of compensation should be considered and if the amounts 
paid out are not well-defined, the trial court should exercise its 
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discretion against those who control the records and do not clearly 
demonstrate the limits of their income. 
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
awarding Defendant her attorney's fees, given the disparate incomes 
of Plaintiff and Defendant. Accordingly, Defendant respectfully 
requests this court to affirm the trial court and to award 
Defendant the costs and attorney's fees she incurred in defending 
this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this f day of September, 1993. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Frank P. O'Donnell, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : 
: CASE NO: 884902181 DA 
vs. : 
: JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
Mary A. O'Donnell, 
Defendant. 
The Court having heard oral argument and taken testimony during the course of hearing 
on the plaintiffs Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree to reduce alimony and child support and 
now being fully advised in tne premises makes tftis its: 
MINUTE ENTRY 
The Petition is denied. The Court is of the opinion that the provable facts regarding 
current income of the plaintiff are not substantially changed from the basis upon which the 
agreement between the parties as to child support and alimony was reached at the time of the 
original entry of the Divorce herein. Because the plaintiff is self employed or at least employed 
in a company in which he and his wife are major employees, stock holders and record keepers 
it is very difficult to establish precisely what each receives from said company. Nevertheless 
it is apparent to the Court that if the tests in Paffel and Rasband are applied there has not been 
such substantial change of material circumstance as to justify a modification at this time. 
O'DONNELLV. O'DONNELL PAGE 2. MINUTE ENTRY 
Counsel for the defendant will prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this y day of December, 1992. 
Richard H. Moffat If 
District Court Judge 
O'DONNELL V. O'DONNELL PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry, 
postage prepaid, to the following on this */ day of December, 1992. 
Ellen Maycock 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Eighth Floor, Valley tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
David S. Dolowitz 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorney for Defendant 
P. O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
* 2 ^ , , 
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EXHIBIT "B' 
:*r,:rd Judicial District 
DAVID S. • DOLOWITZ (0899) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South 
Fifth Floor 
P. O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOOOooo 
FRANK P. O' DONNELL, ) 
) O R D E R 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) Civil No. 884902181DA 
MARY A. O' DONNELL, ) Judge: Richard H. Moffat 
Defendant. ) 
oooOOOooo 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial 
on the Plaintiff s Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree and to 
Reduce Alimony and Child Support and the Defendant' s Request for 
Attorney7 s Fees incurred in defending the Plaintiff s Petition. 
The Plaintiff was present in person represented by counsel, Ellen 
Maycock. The Defendant was present in person represented by 
counsel, David S. Dolowitz. The court heard and considered the 
testimony of each of the parties and reviewed the exhibits 
introduced by them, then determined to take the matter under 
advisement. Having considered the evidence presented, the 
arguments of counsel, and the governing law, the court issued its 
Minute Entry Ruling on the 4th day of December, 1992. Being thus 
APR - 1 1993 
•-' fiiCCO'JNTY 
advised in the premises, and having entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that: 
1. The Petition of the Plaintiff to Modify the Decree 
of Divorce is denied. 
2. The Defendant shall submit her Affidavit regarding 
attorney' s fees and unpaid alimony and child support so that the 
court can determine whether or not the Defendant is entitled to 
attorney' s fees and if so, in what amount based upon the economic 
circumstances of the parties pursuant to the evidence introduce by 
them at the trial in this jaatter. 
DATED this J_ day of 
'Dis t r i ct/ccni^bf Judge 
2 
APPROVED KSJSQ. \\\ 
FORM *$^ ijmiikrs 
THIS £l day of 
March, 1993: / 
ELLEN MAlTCOCK, Counsel 
f o r P l a i n t i f f 
iL/u<^^* Cot- Ky t^^te****^' 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, Counsel 
for Defendant £ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed this I f day 
of March, 1993, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to 
the following individual: 
Ms, Ellen Maycock 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
(mb\dsd\0'Donnell. Order) 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
'.\rz Judicial District 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South 
Fifth Floor 
P. 0. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THi;RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOOOooo 
FRANK P. 0' DONNELL, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) Civil No. 884902181DA 
MARY A. O' DONNELL, ) Judge: Richard H. Moffat 
Defendant. ) 
oooOOOooo 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial 
on the Plaintiff s Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree and to 
Reduce Alimony and Child Support and the Defendant' s Request for 
Attorney' s Fees incurred in defending the Plaintiff s Petition. 
The Plaintiff was present in person represented by counsel, Ellen 
Maycock. The Defendant was present in person represented by 
counsel, David S. Dolowitz. The court heard and considered the 
testimony of each of the parties and reviewed the exhibits 
introduced by them, then determined to take the matter under 
advisement. Having considered the evidence presented, the 
arguments of counsel, and the governing law, the court issued its 
Minute Entry Ruling on the 4th day of December, 1992. Being thus 
APR -1 1993 
;'LTLAr: 
advised in the premises, the court now makes and enters the 
following as its, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. At the time the parties were divorced, the court in 
paragraph 5 of its Amended Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law 
as entered on the 10th day of October, 1991/ determined that the 
Plaintiff was employed throughout the marriage and has had the 
following history of earnings: 
Year Company Amount 
1980 Kilborn, Ltd- $ 39,203 
1981 Kilborn, Ltd. $ 43,508 
1982 Kilborn, Ltd. $ 57,800 
1983 Kilborn, Ltd. $ 49,200 
1984 Kilborn, ltd. $ 57,694 
1985 Custom Equipment $ 80,912 
1986 Scotia Systems, Inc. $ 17,193 
1987 Scotia Systems, Inc. $133, 391 
1988 Scotia, Inc. $115,653 
1989 Scotia, Inc. $161,000 
In 1990, Plaintiff had W-2 income of $48,000.00 and 
presently has income of $4,000. 00 per month. The Defendant is 
presently employed as a legal assistant and earns a gross income of 
$1, 500. 00 per month. 
2. The Plaintiff testified that he is supposed to be 
paid $4,000.00 per month by his employer Scotia Engineering. 
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3. The Plaintiff is an officer and director of Scotia 
Engineering. He has remarried during since the entry of the Decree 
of Divorce in this marriage. His present wife keeps the books and 
records for Scotia Engineering. 
4. At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce in 
this matter, the Plaintiff was not being paid $4, 000. 00 per month, 
but believed he would be able to continue to make that kind of 
income from Scotia Engineering and in February of 1991 believed 
that he could continue to make $4, 000. 00 per month. 
5. The Plaintiff s present wife, Susan, has a base 
salary of $3,000.00 per month from Scotia Engineering. 
6. In addition to the Plaintiff s salary, he receives 
a car, medical insurance and an entertainment allowance which he 
uses for entertaining clients, but which also pays for his travel 
and entertainment. 
7. It is difficult from the records brought into court 
and the testimony of the Plaintiff and his wife, to determine 
precisely what is the Plaintiff s present income. The alimony and 
child support awards that were set on February 28, 1991, were set 
by agreement between the parties. The Plaintiff knowing that 
Scotia Engineering was having difficulty paying him, made the 
determination to set child support and alimony at the levels set by 
the court. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes 
and enters the following, 
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CONCLUSIONS OF f.AW 
1. In determining if there is a change of circumstances 
or determining whether or not the alimony paid by the Plaintiff to 
the Defendant should be adjusted, the court considers not only the 
income of the Plaintiff, but of his present spouse pursuant to the 
decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Paffel v. 
Paffel,, 732 P. 2d 96 (Utah, 1986). 
2. In determining the income of the Plaintiff, the 
court considers not only the income which he has paid and for which 
he receives a W-2 form, but it also must consider the value of the 
perks and expenses that are paid for him, including travel and 
entertainment, Rasband v. Rashand, 752 P. 2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988). 
3. Because Plaintiff is self-employed, or at least 
employed in a company in which he and his wife are major employees, 
stockholders and record keepers, it is very difficult to establish 
precisely what each receives from that company. 
4. The burden of proof in establishing that a 
substantial change of material circumstances has occurred which 
requires the court to modify the Decree of Divorce, is upon 
Plaintiff, Bridenbauah v. Bridenbauqh. 786 P. 2d 241 (Utah App. 
1990). The Plaintiff has failed to meet this test in light of the 
fact that he has not established clearly what he and his wife were 
paid by the company by which they are employed and of which they 
are controlling parties. Plaintiff has not established any 
material change in the earnings of the Defendant. The Plaintiff 
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acknowledges that his earnings were uncertain at the time that he 
entered into the Agreement in February, 1991 to pay alimony and 
child support in the amounts ordered by the court and taking all of 
these circumstances together, the Plaintiff has failed to establish 
the change in circumstances required for a modification of the 
Decree of Divorce that was entered in this matter based upon the 
Stipulation agreement of the parties. 
5. The Defendant has requested that she be awarded 
attorney' s fees for being required to defend this matter and that 
judgment be entered against the Plaintiff for the unpaid alimony 
and child support under the original Decree of Divorce. She should 
be directed to submit her Affidavit regarding the attorney1 s fees 
so that the court can determine whether or not the Defendant is 
entitled to attorney' s fees and if so, in what amount based upon 
the economic circumstances of the parties pursuant to the evidence 
introduced by them at the Atrial in thisr matter. 
DATED this f ^3ay ofJS^hTl993. 
•fil CHARD H/ mtiffiJS, 
D i s t r i c t /Coviriu Judge 
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APPROVED AS TO 
FORM 
THIS ^°\ day of 
March, 1993: 
ELLEN MAECOCK, Counsel 
for Plaintiff 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, Counsel 
for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed this / (day 
of March, 1993, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the following individual: 
Ms. Ellen Maycock 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
/ m h \ W ^ \ n ' n n n n d 7 7 V^ITF 1 
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EXHIBIT "D" 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Frank O'Donnell, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiffs, : 
: CASE NO: 884902181 DA 
vs. : 
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
Mary Agnes O'Donnell, : 
Defendant. : 
The Court having considered the Objection to the Request for Attorney's Fees and having 
heard oral argument thereon and now being fully advised in the premises makes this its: 
MINUTE ENTRY 
The Court feels the question as to whether or not the defendant will obligated to pay 
attorney's fees by reason of the fact that she is employed by her attorney is not the proper 
inquiry in this case. Obviously she is entitled to be awarded her attorney's fees if under all the 
principles governing such matters she would normally be so entitled. The question of whether 
or not her attorney by and through the generosity of himself and his firm is willing to absorb 
the loss, if the defendant sustains one, should not be determinative as to whether or not the 
defendant is entitled to those fees under the general principles. The Court is of the opinion that 
in this case the defendant has demonstrated a need for some of her attorney's fees to be paid by 
the plaintiff and that the plaintiff by reason of the fact that both he and his wife are employed 
and are earning more money than the plaintiff regardless of what that amount might be and by 
the reason of the fact that the defendant has not been paid the amounts to which she is entitled 
ODONNELL V. ODONNELL PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
under the orders of the Court all mitigate toward the award of some attorney's fees to the 
defendant from the plaintiff. The Court is opinion that the plaintiff should pay $4,000.00 of the 
defendant's attorney Is fees and costs. 
Counsel for the defendant will prepare an appropriate order. 
ODONNELL V. ODONNELL PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry, 
postage prepaid, to the following on this I ( day of May, 1993. 
Ellen Maycock 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
David S. Dolowitz 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorney for Defendant 
P. O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
EXHIBIT "E" 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (08 99) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South 
Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooO 0 Oooo 
FRANK P. O'DONNELL, ) 
) ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) Civil No. 884902181DA 
MARY A. O'DONNELL, ) Judge: Richard H. Moffat 
Defendant. ) 
oooOOOooo 
Having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree in the above-referenced matter 
rejecting the Plaintiff's Petition to Amend the Decree of Divorce 
and having therein in paragraph 5 reserved the issue of attorney's 
fees and having now had the opportunity to consider the Defendant's 
request for attorney's fees, the court has determined from the 
evidence presented that the Defendant is in need of assistance in 
the payment of her attorney's fees; that she incurred attorney's 
fees in the sum of $5,616.75; that the court has examined those 
attorney's fees and, finding that both the Plaintiff and his 
present wife are employed, and that Plaintiff has actual earnings 
and the obligation of support to him owed by his present wife while 
the Defendant has lesser earnings and no additional support coming 
to her, finds and concludes that the attorney's fees incurred by 
Defendant are reasonable, the Plaintiff has the ability to assist 
Defendant in payment of her attorney's fees amd the Plaintiff 
should be ordered to pay to the Defendant attorney's fees in the 
sum of $4,000.00 and that judgment should be entered against him 
for that amount. 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant and against the 
Plaintiff for $4,000.00 as attorney's fees incurred in this matter 
and the Plaintiff is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff the $4,000.00 
in attorney's fees thus incurred. 
DATED this J day of , 1993. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND 
CONTENT: 
ELLEN MAYCOCK, Counsel 
for Plaintiff 
-A^^ZJb 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, Coun 
for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed this 2. I day 
of May, 1993, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and 
Judgment to the following individual: 
Ms. Ellen Maycock 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
(mb\dsd\0'Donnell.Fees) ^ 
3 
